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Abstract
This paper studies models where the correspondences (or functions) under consideration are
never increasing (or weakly decreasing) in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in
exogenous parameters. Such models include games of strategic substitutes, and include cases
where additionally, some variables may be strategic complements. It is shown that the equi-
librium set in such models is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there is a unique
equilibrium. For a given parameter value, a pair of distinct equilibria are never comparable.
Moreover, generalizing an existing result, it is shown that when a parameter increases, no
new equilibrium is smaller than any old equilibrium. (In particular, in n-player games with
real-valued action spaces, symmetric equilibria increase with the parameter.) Furthermore,
when functions under consideration are weakly decreasing in endogenous variables, a suﬃ-
cient condition is presented that guarantees existence of increasing equilibria (symmetric or
asymmetric) at a new parameter value. This condition is applied to two classes of examples.1 Introduction
Although comparative statics results for general games with strategic complements are well-
developed,2 results of similar generality are less commonly available for games with strategic
substitutes, or in games in which functions under consideration are non-increasing (or weakly
decreasing) in endogenous variables. As is well-known, games with strategic complements
and strategic substitutes are found in many areas of economics. Such games are deﬁned in
Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), and as they show, models of strategic invest-
ment, entry deterrence, technological innovation, dumping in international trade, natural
resource extraction, business portfolio selection, and others can be viewed in a more unify-
ing framework according as the variables under consideration are strategic complements or
strategic substitutes. Moreover, the important class of examples of Cournot oligopolies can
be viewed as a model with strategic substitutes. Bargaining games can provide examples as
well.3 Additional classes of examples are described in Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk
(2006), and include games of team projects with complementary or substitutable tasks, and
tournaments.
For example, we are not aware of a general result for such games that can be applied
to show increasing equilibria in a simple, parametrized, asymmetric, Cournot duopoly with
2Some of this work can be seen in Topkis (1979), Lippman, Mamer, and McCardle (1987), Sobel (1988),
Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Zhou (1994), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Milgrom and Roberts
(1994), Shannon (1995), Villas-Boas (1997), Edlin and Shannon (1998), Echenique (2002), and Echenique
and Sabarwal (2003), among others. Extensive bibliographies are available in Topkis (1998) and in Vives
(1999).
3For example, consider a game where each player bids on a share of a ﬁxed prize, and if the sum of the
bids is less than or equal to the prize, then each player gets her bid, else each player gets 0.
1linear demand, constant marginal cost, and the standard product order on strategy spaces.
Consider a linear inverse market demand curve given by p = a−bQ, with Q = q1+q2, where
q1 is output of ﬁrm 1, and q2 of ﬁrm 2. Suppose each ﬁrm has constant marginal cost c.
Moreover, there is a subsidy of t ≤ c per unit, and this subsidy is split with an exogeously
speciﬁed and ﬁxed share
3
5 for ﬁrm 1, and share
2
5 for ﬁrm 2.4 Thus, ﬁrm 1’s marginal cost
net of subsidy is c − 3
5t, and that of ﬁrm 2 is c − 2
5t. In this case, the unique equilibrium is








3b ), and it is increasing in t.
With the standard product order on strategy spaces, this example does not ﬁt the
framework of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), because the proﬁt functions are not quasi-
supermodular. (Denote proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 at (q1,q2,t) by π1(q1,q2,t), and consider the values
a = 10,b = 1,c = 1,t = 0, and consider (q1,q2) = (3,2), and (q′
1,q′
2) = (4,3). Then,
π1(q′
1,q2,t) ≥ π1(q1,q2,t), but π1(q′
1,q′
2,t) < π1(q1,q′
2,t).) Moreover, this implies that this
game is not supermodular, and therefore, this example does not ﬁt the framework of Topkis
(1979), Sobel (1988), or Vives (1990). If the order on one of the strategy spaces is reversed,
then it is known (see, for example, Milgrom and Shannon (1994), and a detailed application
in Amir (1996)) that this example is a quasi-supermodular game with the single crossing
property, and therefore, using Milgrom and Shannon (1994), equilibria are non-decreasing
(in the new order) in t. Of course, this does not imply that equilibria are increasing or weakly
increasing in the standard product order in t. Moreover, asymmetric Cournot conditions rule
out an application of Amir and Lambson (2000), and of the intersection point theorem of
4Alternatively, the parameter t can be thought of as technological improvement, and (3
5, 2
5) can be thought
of as diﬀerential adaptation of technological improvement. A slightly more general example is presented later.
2Tarski (1955).5
One general result is available for games where best responses of endogenous variables
are weakly decreasing. As shown by Villas-Boas (1997), in such games, equilibria do not
decrease when the exogenous parameter increases. Moreover, for Cournot oligopolies, if
a new partial order can be chosen, then with some additional assumptions, there is a new
partial order such that equilibria are increasing in this new order. Additionally, some aspects
of non-monotone mappings that are increasing in some variables and decreasing in others
are explored in Roy (2002).
For the models considered here, this paper sheds light on some reasons for the failure
of the usual techniques to show increasing equilibria. Moreover, it generalizes an existing
result and applies it to show that symmetric equilibria are increasing in the parameter.
Furthermore, it provides a suﬃcient condition for existence of increasing equilibria that can
be applied to asymmetric equilibria.
5Tarski’s intersection point theorem applies to linearly ordered spaces. It is noteworthy that one trick
that can work for the special duopoly case is to compose the reaction functions of the two ﬁrms. This yields
an increasing function. In this case, an equilibrium can be shown to exist, and at least for one of the players,
equilibrium can be shown to be increasing, but (in asymmetric Cournot) not necessarily for the other player.
Indeed, as shown below, it is easy to formulate examples of simple Cournot duopolies where the equilibrium
is increasing for one player, and decreasing for the other. The same point applies to techniques that apply
when the best response of one player depends only on the aggregate best response of other players. Of course,
such techniques have been formulated primarily to prove existence theorems for Cournot oligopolies, and not
necessarily to show increasing equilibria. See, for example, Selten (1970), Roberts and Sonnenschien (1976),
Bamon and Fraysee (1985), Novshek (1985), Kukushkin (1994), and Amir (1996), and additional discussion
in Vives (1999).
3This paper considers models in which either (1) correspondences under consideration
are never increasing in endogenous variables,6 and weakly increasing in parameters, or (2)
functions under consideration are weakly decreasing in endogenous variables, and weakly
increasing in parameters.7
The ﬁrst result shows that for models in which correspondences of endogenous variables
are never increasing, the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there
is a unique equilibrium. Indeed, for a given parameter value, a pair of distinct equilibria are
never comparable. Therefore, with multiple equilibria, some of the established techniques
for exhibiting increasing equilibria or computing equilibria that use the largest or smallest
equilibrium, or the lattice structure of the equilibrium set do not apply to such models.8
The second result generalizes to the case of never increasing correspondences, the result
by Villas-Boas (1997) for the case of weakly decreasing functions; that is, in such cases,
when a parameter increases, no new equilibrium is smaller than any old equilibrium. In the
particular case of n-player games with real-valued action spaces and symmetric equilibria,
this implies that when a parameter increases, each symmetric equilibrium increases as well.
Furthermore, it is shown by means of an example of a Cournot duopoly that in such models,
6Never increasing correspondences are a generalization of non-increasing functions in partially ordered
spaces, and weakly decreasing functions in linearly ordered spaces. This class of models includes those in
which best-response functions are increasing in some endogenous variables and decreasing in others. Thus,
it includes models in which endogenous variables are strategic substitutes for each other, and includes cases
where additionally, some endogenous variables may be strategic complements.
7This class of models includes those in which endogenous variables are strategic substitutes for each other.
8This results also shows that there are no ranked equilibria, and therefore, even with multiple equilibria,
these models do not have ineﬃciencies that arise purely from existence of ranked equilbria.
4in general, with asymmtric equilibria, (and with a ﬁxed partial order,) increasing equilib-
rium selections may not exist, even when the product of best response functions is strictly
decreasing in endogenous variables, and strictly increasing in exogenous parameters, and for
every parameter value, there is a unique equilibrium.
The ﬁnal result considers models in which the functions under consideration are weakly
decreasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters, and
presents a suﬃcient condition that guarantees existence of increasing equilibria at a new
parameter value. This result applies to asymmetric equilibria. Intuitively, in games of
strategic substitutes, there are two opposing eﬀects of an increase in the parameter value.
The direct eﬀect increases each player’s best response, but strategic substitutes imply that
an increase in the best response of other players has an additional indirect and opposite
eﬀect on each player’s best response. At a new parameter value, if this indirect eﬀect does
not dominate the direct eﬀect, then a larger equilibrium exists.9 The condition here applies
to games with strategic substitutes, ﬁnite number of players, ﬁnite-dimensional strategy
spaces, and continuous best response functions. The condition is tight in the sense that with
a weakenened condition, the same result may not obtain. This result is applied to two classes
of examples; the ﬁrst includes team projects with substitutable tasks, and second includes
tournaments; both classes are described in Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2006).
Notice that as shown by Villas-Boas (1997), in the case of a Cournot oligopoly, when
a new partial order can be chosen as well, then there exists a new partial order in which
equilibria are increasing. For a given partial order, it is not known under what conditions
a similar result obtains. There may be cases when a given partial order is a natural one
9Notably, in games with strategic complements, both eﬀects work in the same direction.
5for the model under consideration. For example, for a Cournot oligopoly, the product order
may be natural when considering the impact of taxes or subsidies on ﬁrm output. In games
of strategic complements, the product order is used commonly for the same reason; that is,
to investigate the impact of diﬀerent parameters on each agent’s choice. The results here
apply to cases where a partial order is considered as ﬁxed.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents results for
never-increasing correspondences. Section 4 presents a suﬃcient condition for the existence
of increasing equilibria when the correspondences under consideration are weakly decreasing
functions of endogenous variables, and applies this condition to two classes of examples.
2 Model
Suppose (X, ) is a partially ordered set, and A and B are subsets of X. Then A is weakly
smaller than B, if for every a ∈ A, there is b ∈ B such that a   b, and for every b ∈ B,
there is a ∈ A such that a   b. A correspondence g : X ։ X is weakly increasing, if for
every x,y ∈ X with x   y, it is the case that g(x) is weakly smaller than g(y).
A correspondence g : X ։ X is never increasing, if for every x,y ∈ X with x ≺ y,
for every x′ ∈ g(x), and for every y′ ∈ g(y), it is the case that x′    y′. In other words, g is
never increasing, if regardless of which point (y′) we choose in the image of a higher point
6(y), this point is not higher than any point (x′) in the image of a lower point (x).10 11
The model space for endogenous variables is assumed to be a non-empty, compact, convex
subset of Euclidean space, denoted X. The space for exogenous parameters is assumed to
be a partially ordered set, denoted T. An admissible family of correspondences is a
correspondence g : X × T ։ X such that for every t, the correspondence g( ,t) is never
increasing, non-empty valued, compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continous,
and for every x, the correspondence g(x, ) is weakly increasing.
Assumptions other than those regarding correspondences that are never increasing in
10Notice that when g is a function, this deﬁnition coincides with the standard deﬁnition of a non-increasing
function; that is, x   y ⇒ g(x)    g(y), and moreover, for linearly ordered spaces, this deﬁnition coincides
with that of a weakly decreasing function. For purposes of application, non-increasing functions are likely
to be more useful than never-increasing correspondences. Indeed, we are not aware of particular economic
applications in which correspondences are never-increasing, as deﬁned here. The results here show that at
least one extension to correspondences works, and our hope is that this version is available to researchers
thinking about more general cases.
11An idea of the extent of strategic complements permissible in this model can be formed as follows.
Consider a game with N ≥ 2 players, each with a one-dimensional strategy space, and each with a payoﬀ
function, denoted πi(x), where x ∈ RN is a vector of endogenous variables, one component for each player.
For player i, a pair of endogenous variables (xj,xk), (j  = k) are strategic complements if
∂
2πi
∂xj∂xk ≥ 0, and
strategic substitutes if ∂
2πi
∂xj∂xk < 0. Suppose that best responses are functions, rather than correspondences,




pairs of variables that could be strategic complements or




pairs of possible pairs that could be strategic complements or substitutes.
Consider the following condition: there is n0 such that for m  = no,
∂
2πn0




∂xm0∂xn0 < 0. In this case, it is easy to see that the product of gn is a non-increasing function,




− N pairs of variables can be strategic complements. Of course, other
estimates would depend on the particular situation under consideration.
7endogenous variables and weakly increasing in parameters are made to guarantee existence
of equilibrium via Kakutani’s theorem. Notably, both theorems of Tarski are not applicable
to the general case considered here. Moreover, as mentioned in Vives (1999) (page 42), a
general n-dimensional existence theorem for decreasing best responses does not appear to
be available even for the case of functions.12 Given existence of equilibrium, the results here
apply to arbitrary, partially ordered X.
Consider an admissible family of correspondences g, and deﬁne the following sets. Let
S
¯
(t) = {x ∈ X | ∃x′ ∈ g(x,t),x′   x}, let ¯ S(t) = {x ∈ X | ∃x′ ∈ g(x,t),x   x′}, let minS
¯
(t)
be the minimal elements of S
¯
(t), let max ¯ S(t) be the maximal elements of ¯ S(t), and let
FP(t) = {x ∈ X | x ∈ g(x,t)} be the ﬁxed points of g at t. Kakutani’s theorem implies that
for every t, FP(t) is non-empty.
3 Non-Lattice Equilibrium Sets and Nowhere Decreas-
ing Equilibria
It is useful to consider one particular reason for the failure of a standard proof of Tarski’s
theorem when correspondences are never-increasing.13 This particular failure is notable,
because it is related to a modiﬁcation that does apply in the models considered here, and
this modiﬁcation helps understand comparability of equilibria when correspondences are
never-increasing.
12Recent developments showing existence of equilibrium for aggregative games are given in Kukushkin
(1994), and in Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2006).
13For a version of the standard proof, see Topkis (1998), page 39.
8In a standard proof, the set S
¯




(t), and inf S
¯
(t) is the
smallest ﬁxed point. Similarly, ¯ S(t) has a supremum, sup ¯ S(t) ∈ ¯ S(t), and sup ¯ S(t) is the
largest ﬁxed point. Monotone increasing selections can then be exhibited by considering
these extremal ﬁxed points. With never increasing correspondences, it is easily possible that
the set S
¯
(t) does not contain an inﬁmum, and the set ¯ S(t) does not contain a supremum. In
such cases, the supremum and inﬁmum cannot be ﬁxed points. For example, consider ﬁgure
1, which gives best response functions of two agents. These functions can be viewed as best
responses in a Cournot duopoly where ﬁrm 1 has a lower marginal cost at a higher level
of output, and ﬁrm 2 has constant marginal cost. As shown, the product of best responses
is a weakly decreasing function. Moreover, S
¯
(t) is the area with lower boundary given by
ABDE, and it does not contain a smallest point, ¯ S(t) is the area with upper boundary
given by FBCDG, and it does not contain a largest point, inf S
¯




(t)  ∈ FP(t),
sup ¯ S(t)  ∈ ¯ S(t), and sup ¯ S(t)  ∈ FP(t).
Nevertheless, as shown in the following lemma, equilibrium points are minimal elements
of S
¯
(t), and maximal elements of ¯ S(t). These properties are useful in trying to understand
when are equilibria comparable, and when is the equilibrium set a lattice.
Lemma 1. Let g : X × T ։ X be an admissible family of correspondences.
If x∗ ∈ FP(t), then x∗ ∈ minS
¯
(t) ∩ max ¯ S(t).
Proof. Let x∗ ∈ FP(t). Then x∗ ∈ g(x∗,t), and x∗   x∗, so x∗ ∈ S
¯
(t). Suppose, by way
of contradiction, there is ˆ x ∈ S
¯
(t) with ˆ x  = x∗, and ˆ x   x∗; that is, ˆ x ≺ x∗. As ˆ x ∈ S
¯
(t),
there is x′ ∈ g(ˆ x,t) such that x′   ˆ x. In other words, ˆ x ≺ x∗, and there exist x′ ∈ g(ˆ x,t)
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Figure 1: maxS(t), minS(t) and Non-lattice Equlibrium Sets
Similarly, x∗ ∈ FP(t) ⇒ x∗ ∈ ¯ S(t). If x∗  ∈ max ¯ S(t), then there is ˆ x ∈ ¯ S(t) such that
x∗ ≺ ˆ x. Consequently, there is x′ ∈ g(ˆ x,t), and x∗ ∈ g(x∗,t) such that x∗   x′, contradicting
the fact that g is never increasing.
In the example provided in ﬁgure 1, the minimal elements of S
¯
(t) are given by the
boundary depicted by ABDE, and maximal elements of ¯ S(t) are given by the boundary
depicted by FBCDG, and each of the two equilibria satisﬁes the conclusion of the lemma.
This lemma is useful in proving the following sets of results; presented in theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 1. Let g : X × T ։ X be an admissible family of correspondences.
1. If x∗, ˆ x ∈ FP(t), and x∗  = ˆ x, then x∗ and ˆ x are non-comparable.
2. The following are equivalent:
10(a) FP(t) is a non-empty lattice,
(b) FP(t) is a singleton, and
(c) FP(t) is a non-empty, complete lattice.
Proof. The ﬁrst statement follows from the lemma above, as follows. If x∗ and ˆ x are distinct
ﬁxed points of g at t, then these are maximal elements of ¯ S(t), and hence, these are non-
comparable. The only part of the second statement that needs to be checked is that the ﬁrst
sub-statement implies the second. (The other implications are trivial.) Suppose FP(t) is a
non-empty, complete lattice, and suppose it contains at least two distinct points, say x∗ and
ˆ x, with x∗  = ˆ x. Then it contains the join and meet of these points, the join and meet are
distinct points, and the join and meet are comparable, contradicting part (1) above.
This theorem shows that for a given parameter value, a pair of distinct equilibria are
always non-comparable. In particular, in contrast to equilibria in games with complemen-
tarities, this theorem implies that models considered here do not have ranked equilibria. A
graphical example with two equilibria is presented in ﬁgure 1.
Moreover, as compared to the complete lattice structure of the equilibrium set when
functions of endogenous variables are increasing, (see Zhou (1994),) the equilibrium set here
is a non-empty, complete lattice exactly in the trivial case of a unique equilibrium. Otherwise,
the equilibrium set is totally unordered. (A graphical example with two equilibria, and in
which the equilibrium set is not a lattice is provided in ﬁgure 1.) Consequently, with multiple
equilibria, techniques using the lattice structure of the equilibrium set, or the existence of a
smallest and largest equilibrium do not apply to models considered here.
Furthermore, this result implies that in the special case when X is linearly ordered, there
11is a unique equilibrium for every parameter value.
Theorem 2. Let g : X × T ։ X be an admissible family of correspondences.
For every t1,t2 ∈ T, if t1   t2, x∗ ∈ FP(t1), x∗∗ ∈ FP(t2), and x∗  = x∗∗, then x∗∗    x∗.
Proof. When t1 = t2, the result follows from part (1) of Theorem 1. Suppose that t1 ≺ t2,
and consider distinct ﬁxed points x∗ ∈ FP(t1), x∗∗ ∈ FP(t2), and suppose x∗∗   x∗. Recall




(t1). Moreover, g(x∗∗, ) is weakly increasing in t implies
that g(x∗∗,t1) is weakly smaller than g(x∗∗,t2). As x∗∗ ∈ g(x∗∗,t2), let x′ ∈ g(x∗∗,t1) be such
that x′   x∗∗. Then x∗∗ ∈ S
¯
(t1), contradicting the fact that x∗ is a minimal element of S
¯
(t1).
This theorem generalizes to the case of never increasing correspondences, the result by
Villas-Boas for the case of decreasing functions; that is, in such cases, when a parameter
increases, no new equilibrium is smaller than any old equilibrium. Thus, equilibria are
nowhere decreasing in t.
In particular, this result implies that in the models considered here, there are no decreas-
ing selections of equilibria.
Moreover, combined with the previous theorem, it follows that if X is linearly ordered,
then there is a unique equilibrium for every t, and this equilibrium selection is increasing in
t. In particular, for games with real-valued strategies, symmetric equilibria are increasing,
as formalized in the following corollaries.14
14As discussed in the introduction, with decreasing best responses, symmetric equilibria can be shown to
be increasing using Tarski’s intersection point theorem (see, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1994)). The
corollaries here present another proof as an application of the previous theorem, and this proof does not
require Tarski’s theorem.
12Corollary 1. Consider a game of n-players, each with a non-empty, compact, convex strategy
space Xi ⊂ ℜ, X = ×n
i=1Xi, a parameter space T, and g : X × T ։ X a product of best
response correspondences, and g is never-increasing. Say that an equilibrium x∗ ∈ FP(t)
is a symmetric equilibrium if for all i,j, x∗
i = x∗
j. Let SE(t) be the (possibly empty) set of
symmetric equilibria. In this case, the following is true.
For every t0,ˆ t ∈ T, if t0   ˆ t, x∗ ∈ SE(t0), and x∗∗ ∈ SE(ˆ t), then x∗   x∗∗.
Proof. We know that x∗∗    x∗. Therefore, there is i such that x∗
i ≤ x∗∗
i . As x∗,x∗∗ are
symmetric equilibria, this implies that x∗   x∗∗.
Thus, in the class of games with non-increasing best response functions and symmetric
equilibria, equilibria are increasing. Indeed,
Corollary 2. Suppose the same class of games as in the previous corollary. Then the
following is true.
If for every t, SE(t)  = ∅, then every selection from SE(t) is a (weakly) increasing selection.
More generally, with asymmetric players, the conclusion of the theorem and corollaries
above cannot be strengthened to conclude the existence of increasing equilibria, even when
there is always a unique equilibrium, as shown in the following example.
Example 1. Consider a standard Cournot duopoly with a linear inverse market demand
curve given by p = a − bQ, with Q = q1 + q2, where q1 is output of ﬁrm 1, and q2 of ﬁrm 2.
Suppose each ﬁrm has constant marginal cost c, but ﬁrm 1 gets a subsidy of t ≤ c per unit,
so that ﬁrm 1’s marginal cost net of subsidy is c − t. Then best response function of ﬁrm 1
is g1(q2,t) = a−c+t
2b −
q2
2 , and that of ﬁrm 2 is g2(q1,t) = a−c
2b −
q1
2 . It is easy to check that
g(q1,q2,t) ≡ (g1(q2,t),g2(q1,t)) is a strictly decreasing correspondence in (q1,q2), it is strictly







Consequently, and as shown ﬁgure 2, there are no increasing equilibria, regardless of the













Figure 2: Non-existence of Increasing Equilibria
Notice that the lemma and two theorem in this section apply as stated when X is an
arbitrary, partially ordered set.
4 Existence of Increasing Equilibria
This section considers functions that are weakly decreasing in endogenous variables, and
weakly increasing in parameters, and provides a suﬃcient condition, which when satisﬁed at
a new parameter value, guarantees existence of increasing equilibria for the new parameter
14value. This condition is applied to two classes of examples to show existence of increasing
equilibria.
To develop a better understanding of the general result, it is helpful to view it explicitly
in the special case of a game with two agents, each with a decreasing best response function,
each with a one-dimensional action space, and with the partial order determined by the
product order. This case is considered below, and for additional insight, in this case, a direct
proof is provided as well.
Consider a game with two agents, indexed i = 1,2. Agent i’s action space is a non-empty,
compact, convex interval Ii of the real numbers, and there is a partially ordered parameter
space T. Agent i’s response function is gi : Ij×T → Ii, with i  = j. For each i and t, suppose
that gi( ,t) is strictly decreasing, and for each i, and for each xj ∈ Ij, suppose that gi(xj, )
is strictly increasing. Let X = I1 × I2, and with the product order (denoted ≤). Suppose
g(x1,x2,t) ≡ (g1(x2,t),g2(x1,t)) is a continuous function in (x1,x2), and let FP(t) be the set
of ﬁxed points of g at t.15 For notational convenience, let gi,t( ) ≡ gi( ,t), and gt( ) ≡ g( ,t).
Theorem 3. Fix t0 ∈ T, let x∗ = (x∗
1,x∗
2) ∈ FP(t0), and consider ˆ t ∈ T with t0   ˆ t such
that (1) x∗
2 ≤ g2,ˆ t(g1,ˆ t(x∗
2)), and (2) x∗
1 ≤ g1,ˆ t(g2,ˆ t(x∗
1)).
Then there is ˆ x = (ˆ x1, ˆ x2) ∈ FP(ˆ t) such that x∗ ≤ ˆ x.
































15For reference, notice that this game allows for multiple equilibria. (An example to show this can be
constructed from ﬁgure 1.) Moreover, this games allows for agent conditions to be asymmetric.
15where the weak inequality follows from (1) and the fact that g
−1















last inequality follows from the fact that g
−1
2,ˆ t( ) is weakly increasing in t.




2)] such that g2,ˆ t(ˆ x1) = g
−1
1,ˆ t(ˆ x1). Let ˆ x2 = g2,ˆ t(ˆ x1),
and notice that g1,ˆ t(ˆ x2) = g1,ˆ t(g
−1
1,ˆ t(ˆ x1)) = ˆ x1, whence ˆ x = (ˆ x1, ˆ x2) ∈ FP(ˆ t).




2)], we conclude that x∗
1 ≤ ˆ x1, and moroever,
ˆ x1 ≤ g
−1
2,ˆ t(x∗




2, whence x∗ ≤ ˆ x.
The conditions in this theorem can be viewed explicitly, as follows. Starting from an
existing equilibrium, x∗ = (x∗
1,x∗
2) at t = t0, an increase in t has two eﬀects on g2,t( ). One
eﬀect is an increase in g2,t, because response functions are increasing in t. (This is a direct
eﬀect of an increase in t.) The other eﬀect is a decrease in g2,t( ), because an increase in t
increases g1,t(x∗
2), and x1 and x2 are strategic substitutes. (This is an indirect eﬀect arising
from the response of player 1 to an increase in t.) Similar statements are valid for player
1 as well. Taken together, conditions (1) and (2) say that for each player, as long as the
indirect strategic substitute eﬀect does not dominate the direct parameter eﬀect, there is a
new equilibrium that is larger than x∗ = (x∗
1,x∗
2). A graphical illustration of these conditions
is presented in ﬁgure 3.
It is useful to note that if either condition is not satisﬁed, this theorem may not necessarily
apply. This can be seen in the following generalized version of example 1, and graphically in
ﬁgure 4, where condition (1) is violated but (2) is satisﬁed, and in ﬁgure 5, where the reverse
is true.
Example 2. Consider a standard Cournot duopoly with a linear inverse market demand















Figure 3: Existence of Increasing Equilibria
2. Suppose each ﬁrm has constant marginal cost c. Moreover, there is a subsidy of t ≤ c
per unit, and this subsidy is split with share ξ ∈ [0,1] for ﬁrm 1, and share 1 − ξ for ﬁrm
2. (Example 1 is the case where ξ = 1, and the example in the introduction is the case
where ξ = 3
5.) Thus, ﬁrm 1’s marginal cost net of subsidy is c − ξt, and that of ﬁrm 2 is
c − (1 − ξ)t. Then best response function of ﬁrm 1 is g1(q2,t) =
a−c+ξt−bq2
2b , and that of ﬁrm
2 is g2(q1,t) =
a−c+(1−ξ)t−bq1
2b . It is easy to check that g(q1,q2,t) ≡ (g1(q2,t),g2(q1,t)) is a
strictly decreasing correspondence in (q1,q2), it is strictly increasing in t, and the unique









1(t) is decreasing in t, and q∗
2(t) is increasing in t,
1
3 ≤ ξ ≤ 2
3 ⇔ q∗
1(t) is increasing in t, and q∗
2(t) is increasing in t, and
2
3 < ξ ⇔ q∗
1(t) is increasing in t, and q∗















Figure 4: Violation of condition (1)
Moreover, for t0 ≤ ˆ t, g2,ˆ t(g1,ˆ t(q∗
2(t0))) = 1
12b[4(a−c)+(6−9ξ)(ˆ t−t0)+(8−12ξ)t0], whence for
t0 ≤ ˆ t, q∗
2(t0) ≤ g2,ˆ t(g1,ˆ t(q∗
2(t0))) ⇔ ξ ≤
2




c) + (9ξ − 3)(ˆ t − t0) + (12ξ − 4)t0], whence for t0 ≤ ˆ t, q∗
1(t0) ≤ g1,ˆ t(g1,ˆ t(q∗
1(t0))) ⇔ ξ ≥ 1
3.
Thus, if ξ > 2
3, then condition (1) is violated, but (2) is satisﬁed, and if ξ < 1
3, then condition
(1) is satisﬁed, but (2) is violated.
A similar tradeoﬀ between direct and indirect eﬀects is useful in proving a more general
theorem. Consider an admissible family of correspondences, g : X × T ։ X, where for
each t ∈ T, g( ,t) is a weakly decreasing function, and for each x ∈ X, g(x, ) is a weakly
increasing function. To distinguish this from the general case of correspondences, denote














Figure 5: Violation of condition (2)
Theorem 4. Consider g : X × T → X as above, ﬁx t0 ∈ T, and let x∗ ∈ FP(t0). Consider
ˆ t ∈ T such that t0   ˆ t, and let ˆ y = gˆ t(x∗).
If x∗   gˆ t(ˆ y), then there is ˆ x ∈ FP(ˆ t) such that x∗   ˆ x.
Proof. Notice that as g is weakly increasing in t, x∗   ˆ y. Moreover, for every x in [x∗, ˆ y],
gˆ t(x) ∈ [x∗, ˆ y], and this can be seen as follows. Suppose x∗   x   ˆ y. Then x   ˆ y implies
that gˆ t(x)   gˆ t(ˆ y)   x∗, where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that gˆ t( ) is weakly
decreasing, and the second follows from the condition in the theorem. Moreover, x∗   x
implies that gˆ t(x)   gˆ t(x∗) = ˆ y, where the inequality follows from weakly decreasing gˆ t( ),
and the equality follows from deﬁnition of ˆ y. Therefore, the restriction of gˆ t to [x∗, ˆ y] is a
map from [x∗, ˆ y] to [x∗, ˆ y]. By Kakutani’s theorem, there is ˆ x ∈ [x∗, ˆ y] such that gˆ t(ˆ x) = ˆ x,
and consequently, there is ˆ x ∈ FP(ˆ t) such that x∗   ˆ x.
Notice that for the special case considered in theorem 3, the conditions here specialize
19to those in theorem 3. The intuition for the general case is the same as for the special case.
Suppose gt is a product of best response functions of ﬁnitely many players, and consider an
equilibrium x∗ at t0. Then for each given player, a rise in t has two opposing eﬀects. The
direct eﬀect leads to an increase in the best reponse of the given player. The indirect eﬀect
leads to a decrease in the best response of a given player, because responses of each player
are strategic substitutes for every other player. At a new parameter value, if the indirect
eﬀect does not dominate the direct eﬀect, then there is a new equilibrium larger than x∗.
Notice that existence of increasing equilibria is shown here starting from an arbitrary
equilibrium point. Therefore, this result applies to any equilibrium point that is selected
by some theory of equilibrium selection. If a diﬀerent equilibrium point is selected by a
diﬀerent theory of equilibrium selection, then the condition in this theorem applies to the
diﬀerent equilibrium point. Moreover, with ﬁnitely many equilibria at a parameter value t0,
there are ﬁnitely many conditions, one for each equilibrium, such that if all conditions are
satisﬁed, then regardless of which equilibrium obtains at t0, there is a larger equilibrium.
Furthermore, a condition that applies with potentially inﬁnite number of equilibria, and that
is independent of a theory of equilibrium selection is given in the corollary below.
Corollary 3. Consider g : X × T → X as in the theorem above, ﬁx t0 ∈ T, and let
x∗ ∈ FP(t0). Consider ˆ t ∈ T such that t0   ˆ t, and suppose ˜ x =
W
x∗∈FP(t0) x∗ and ˆ y =
W
x∗∈FP(t0) gˆ t(x∗) are both in X.
If ˜ x   gˆ t(ˆ y), then there is ˆ x ∈ FP(ˆ t) such that x∗   ˆ x.
This corollary can be proved by following the proof of the previous theorem, and noticing
that for every x∗ ∈ FP(t0), gˆ t(˜ x)   gˆ t(x∗)   ˆ y.
20The idea of competing direct and indirect eﬀects helps relate the conditions here to those
that arise in models with strategic complements. In those models, the direct and indirect
eﬀects work in the same direction, and therefore, once a parameter increases, both eﬀects
serve to move the new equilibrium set higher. Moreover, in those models, once increasing
equilibria have been demonstrated, additionally higher parameter values serve to further
increase equilibria, and do not reverse any increases. When direct and indirect eﬀects work
in opposite directions, increasing equilibria are no longer guaranteed. Moreover, even when
the tradeoﬀ between indirect and direct eﬀects implies a larger equilibrium at a higher
parameter value, that tradeoﬀ might not necessarily hold at additionally higher parameter
values, and therefore, a demonstration of a favorable tradeoﬀ at a parameter value does not
necessarily imply increasing equilibria at additionally higher parameter values.
The following examples apply the condition in the previous theorem to exhibit increas-
ing equilibria in cases where equilibria may be asymmetric, and might not necessarily be
computable analytically.
Example 3. Consider games of team projects with substitutable tasks, as follows.16 Suppose
a project is to be accomplished by a team of n ≥ 2 players, each choosing task (or eﬀort)
xi ∈ [0,1], with probability of success xi. The quadratic cost of eﬀort xi is
ci
2 x2
i, and is allowed
to be asymmetric across players. Tasks are substitutable in the sense that each player by
herself can make the project successful. The probability of success is 1 −
Qn
j=1(1 − xj). If
the project is successful, player i receives a parameterized reward (or utility) f(t) > 0 (with
0 ≤ t ≤ T, and f′(t) > 0.)17 Otherwise, the player receives zero. Therefore, the payoﬀ to
16The version used here is the one presented in Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2006).


















and this best response is decreasing in other player actions, and increasing in t. Denote by
gi,t(x−i) the best response function of player i when parameter is t and other player actions
are x−i. Let the equilibrium at t = t∗ be given by (x∗
1,...,x∗























For ease of computation, let φj(t) = (1−
f(t)
f(t∗)x∗
j), and let Φ(t) =
Qn
j=2φj(t). Then the above






























j < 1. One suﬃcient condition for this to hold is
that for all j, x∗
j ≤ 1
n, with strict inequality for one player. A similar condition holds for the
other players as well. Thus, an increasing equilibrium obtains, if for every j, x∗
j < 1
n.
that can induce an increase in eﬀort (or probability) of task completion. As shown below, the best response
function depends on
f(t)
ci , where ci measures player i’s costs, and therefore, f(t) can be viewed as a relative
reward enhancement parameter, relative to a player’s costs.







22Example 4. Consider games of tournaments.19 Suppose a tournament has 3 players, where
a parametrized reward f(t) (with 0 ≤ t ≤ T, and f′(t) > 0)20 is shared by the players
who succeed in the tournament. If one player succeeds, he gets f(t) for sure, if two players
succeed, each gets f(t) with probability one-half, and if all players succeed, each gets f(t)
with probability one-third. Expected reward for player i is
f(t)xi(1 − xj)(1 − xk) +
f(t)
2
xixj(1 − xk) +
f(t)
2




The quadratic cost of eﬀort xi is
ci
2 x2
i, and is allowed to be asymmetric across players. The
payoﬀ to player i is expected reward minus cost of eﬀort. It is easy to calculate that the











and this best response is decreasing in other player actions, and increasing in t. Denote by
gi,t(x−i) the best response function of player i when parameter is t and other player actions
are x−i. Let the equilibrium at t = t∗ be given by (x∗
1,x∗
2,x∗





















































19The version used here is the one presented in Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2006).
20As shown below, the best response function depends on
f(t)
ci , where ci measures player i’s costs, and
therefore, f(t) can be viewed as a relative reward enhancement parameter, relative to a player’s costs.
23Given the domain restriction of strategies to the unit interval, this expression is positive
exactly when either x∗
j < 1 or x∗
k < 1. Similar results hold for players j and k. Consequently,
if the equilibrium is not degenerate, (that is, no player wins the tournament for sure,) then
equilibrium increases with the parameter. The analogous result holds for the n-player case.
Its notationally intensive details are available from the authors, if desired.
The idea of both examples is that if an estimate of an equilibrium is available (perhaps
because we observe a particular equilibrium under given economic conditions), then it can be
concluded whether an increase in economic conditions will increase the equilibrium. Similar
applications of the theorem can be made when an estimate of an equilibrium is available,
and best response functions are computable. In particular, an application of this theorem
does not require that best response functions have analytically closed forms. Therefore, from
a practical point of view, this theorem can have broader applications.
One limitation of this work is the current absence of conditions on the payoﬀ functions
that guarantee the suﬃcient conditions of the last theorem. This remains a subject of
continuing work.
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